Real problems Argorix turns into workflows

From discovering Shadow AI to producing audit-ready evidence, each use case maps directly to Argorix modules you can deploy as SaaS or on-premise.

01Sentinel

Shadow AI Discovery

You cannot govern what you cannot see

Teams adopt copilots, chatbots, APIs, and agents months before governance hears about them. The inventory in your GRC tool is a list someone typed once — the real estate lives in repositories, browser tabs, and CI pipelines nobody is watching.

  • Continuous scanning across repos, SaaS traffic, CI/CD pipelines, and agent registries
  • Every finding resolves to a system, an owner, a model, and a provider — not just a hostname
  • Review queue moves each discovery from shadow to declared, sanctioned, or retired
Explore Sentinel →
sentinel · discovery 37 Shadow AI
Unmanaged AI sources feeding into Sentinel and resolving into a governed inventory repositories saas · browser ci/cd agents · tools SCAN INVENTORY gpt-4o · sales claude · legal llama · infra agent · ops
02AI Red Team

AI Red Teaming

Don’t assume your AI is safe — prove it

A model that passed review in March is a different system in September — new prompts, new tools, new data. Adversarial testing that happens once, in a document, tells you nothing about the app running in production today.

  • Campaigns for prompt injection, instruction leakage, data exposure, and model manipulation
  • Runs on a schedule and on every release, so drift shows up as a failed test, not an incident
  • Every finding lands in remediation with an owner and becomes a reusable evidence object
Explore AI Red Team →
red-team · campaign 6 findings
Adversarial payloads fired at a target AI application, producing findings by severity prompt injection jailbreak chain data exfiltration tool abuse TARGET llm app + 4 tools FINDINGS CRITICALsystem prompt leaked HIGHtool called w/o auth MEDIUMpii echoed in output LOWverbose error trace
03Guardrails

Runtime Guardrails

Policy that runs on the request, not in a PDF

Most AI policy lives in a document nobody can enforce at 3am. Guardrails puts the decision inline with the request — every prompt and every completion is evaluated, and the verdict is allow, redact, or block, in single-digit milliseconds.

  • Inline checks for prompt injection, unsafe output, PII, and secret leakage in both directions
  • Enforcement API and SDK drop in front of any provider — OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure, or self-hosted
  • Human approval routing for the edge cases you don’t want decided automatically
Explore Guardrails →
guardrails · runtime 4 ms p50
A request passing through a policy checkpoint that allows, redacts, or blocks it app request POLICY injection pii · secrets output safety ALLOW REDACT BLOCK
04Control

Compliance Readiness

One control set, mapped to every framework asking

The EU AI Act, ISO 42001, and NIST AI RMF ask overlapping questions in different vocabularies. Answering each one separately means maintaining three spreadsheets that disagree by the second week.

  • Map AI systems once, then satisfy multiple frameworks from the same control evidence
  • Named owners and due dates per control, with remediation tracked to closure
  • Board-level reporting generated from live control state, not a quarterly copy-paste
Explore Control →
control · frameworks 86% mapped
A shared control set mapping onto three regulatory frameworks CONTROL SET42 controls · 8 owners EU AI ACT high-risk · art. 9 · art. 15 ISO 42001 aims · clause 6 · clause 8 NIST AI RMF govern · map · measure
05Evidence Hub

Evidence Readiness

Stop rebuilding proof for every audit

Every audit starts the same way: someone spends three weeks screenshotting dashboards and chasing Slack threads to prove a control was working eight months ago. The proof existed — it just was never captured as an object.

  • Findings, runtime events, policies, and red-team results captured as linked evidence objects
  • Timestamped and hash-sealed at capture, so the pack proves what was true on that date
  • One object satisfies several controls at once — assemble a pack instead of rebuilding it
Explore Evidence Hub →
evidence · pack 12 objects
Scattered evidence fragments converging into a single sealed, audit-ready pack finding · #4821 runtime event policy v3.2 red-team run remediation approval log EVIDENCE PACK sha256:9f2c…a41e
06Observatory

Browser DLP for AI Tools

The leak happens in a browser tab, not in your VPC

Employees paste contracts, customer records, and production code into AI chat tools every day. Network controls never see it — the request leaves an authenticated browser session over TLS to a domain your policy already allows.

  • Managed extension inspects the paste before it leaves the tab — block, warn, or redact
  • Approve or deny AI apps up front, with per-user and per-installation visibility
  • Every sensitive event is logged with user, app, and matched pattern — ready for evidence
Explore Observatory →
observatory · browser dlp 3 redacted
Sensitive data pasted into an AI chat tool being redacted before the request leaves the browser chat.ai-vendor.com Review this contract: ACME Corp · RUT 76.***.***-4 card 4539 **** **** 2231 sk-proj-9fA2•••••••••• …summarize the risk clauses. SENT CLEAN ████ · ████ · ████ 3 patterns redacted
07Guardrails + Intelligence

Agentic AI Security

Agents don’t answer — they act

A chatbot that gets manipulated says something wrong. An agent that gets manipulated calls a tool, moves money, or deletes a record. Controls that only inspect the final answer are looking at the wrong layer — the risk is in the steps.

  • Controls bind to each step, tool call, and action — not just the final output
  • Third-party agents scored with AIVSS and the MAESTRO 7-layer model before you let them in
  • Memory and tool scope constrained per agent, so a poisoned step cannot escalate into the next
Explore Intelligence →
agent · step controls 1 blocked
An agent step chain where each step carries a control, and one unsafe tool call is blocked planstep 1 retrievestep 2 tool: crm.readstep 3 tool: payments.sendstep 4 · injected BLOCKED scope violation MAESTRO · AIVSS
08CodeGuard

Safe Vibe Coding

Your copilot reads every line — including the secrets

Coding agents need context, so they take it: open files, environment variables, connection strings, and whatever else is in the buffer. Blocking the copilot kills developer velocity; allowing it ships your credentials to a third party.

  • Redaction happens locally on the workstation — the secret never reaches the provider
  • Values are restored in the response, so the developer keeps working code, not placeholders
  • Managed policy packs per team, with a full redaction and restore audit trail per endpoint
Explore CodeGuard →
codeguard · endpoint 2 secrets held
Secrets in a developer buffer redacted locally before reaching the cloud copilot, then restored workstation const db = connect( "postgres://u:Pa55w0rd@…" ); API_KEY = "sk-live-9fA2c…" // ask copilot to refactor cloud copilot sees only placeholders const db = connect( <SECRET_1> ); <SECRET_2> restored on the way back
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